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Drought

Northern China is suffering drought. China has around 120 million hectares of arable land, of which slightly less than 10% is currently suffering drought.

According to China Daily, 43% of winter wheat production is affected. The worst winter drought in 50 years.

By comparison 2006 also saw the worst drought in 50 years. That came in the summer season. Soon afterwards strong inflation was seen in food prices and some other related products, that inflation attributed to a mix of the effect of drought and excessive FDI - attribution varying according to analyst.

The weather will be watched closely, inflation could raise it's head again.

China Survey Perceptions of 2008 and Policy Goals for 2009

CCTV2, in connection with Sina, and other news/Internet agencies have run a survey over the Internet for the last several days on perceptions of the economy and what the government should concentrate on during 2009.  While the survey methodology is not made clear (an Internet survey is not an accurate survey methodology) the results are striking, and were just presented on domestic television.

There are several press conferences today discussing 2008, both
statistically and qualitively, which will surely have (are already
having) an impact on policy discussions next month.

What is stark:  Survey respondents' are extremely negative in their expectations for 2009, but are very split on their opinions of what the government should do, and what industries (aside from exporting taking a slight lead) should be protected/promoted.

Here's the survey:

In your opinion, what is the state of the current global economy:
Very Good: 2.0%
Relatively Good:  2.8%
Average:  13.2%
Relatively Bad: 48.1%
Very Poor: 34.0%

What do you think the trend during 2009 will be:
Further Deterioration: 46.0%
Smooth Adjustment: 41.7%
A Positive Trend: 12.%

What should the economic priorities of the government in 2009 be:
Maintain Rapid Economic Growth: 10.9%
Effectively Stimulate Domestic Demand: 14.0%
Increase Government Investment: 5.8%
Improve Social Protection: 20.9%
Effectively Tackle Employment Difficulties: 15.1%
Raise Income and Property Prices: 21.0%
Control Prices (CPI): 12.0%

What do you expect the greatest domestic challenges of 2009 will be:
Exports: 28.7%
Manufacturing: 11.2%
Real Estate: 28.3%
IT Industry: 5.3%
Iron and Steel Industry: 8.8%
Energy Industries: 9.4%
Retail Industries/Services: 4.7%
Entertainment Industry: 3.3%

Some decimal places may be askew, at this moment I cannot find any
online resources which aggregate the results of each survey together,
and the survey appears to still be running on some websites.  There's a version of the survey still live here.

Property in 2nd Tier Cities

Peter and myself are starting a mini-series of posts to run for the next few days analysing the current property market in 2nd tier cities, especially Dalian, and with a probable focus on residential property development and occupational life-cycle.

We'll update this page with recent posts. And links below when we've finalised the pieces:

Part 1: A brief analysis of the seeming unaffordability of property in 2nd tier cities, and how high prices are in fact affordable for many [city residents].

Part 2: Analysis of property in Dalian according to location, and the development and expansion of a 2nd tier city.

Part 3: The developer's dilemma: Sell in a falling market?

Part 4: ROI: Buy to rent?

Part 5: ROI: Buy to rent, what level of capital appreciation?

It's Not a Question of Economics, but of the Economy.

So said a local banker last night.  He was rather annoyed about questions of China's economy increasing domestic demand.  Returning migrant workers... what would they do?  "A girl who can manufacture clothes, or a man who can build sky scrapers isn't going to be much use in a village on the verge of development."  He continued: with no meaningful social or medical insurance, the bank is the last refuge in social stability, a bank, and perceived safety of savings, must remain sacrosanct.  Should unemployment start affecting individuals and family units, he foresaw a definite increase in savings ratios, compounding the danger of perceived risk in the banking system.  This, he added, would have an impact on illegal banks and less formal credit collectives - institutions involved in banking activities would be targetted by public policy before public perceptions in the banking, or quasi-banking, sector could take hold.

A discussion of increasing domestic demand at the household level was largely moot.  It was indeed necessary, but without social reform - reducing the need for households to save, including developing medical and social insurance, would be a slow process.  In the intermediate period, it was not a question of structural changes in the economy, an immediate economic policy was needed to prevent domestic demand slumping further and unemployment increasing.  He added that perceptions and reality of a slowdown were significantly different, a point he felt was important and underappreciated.  A slump in economic activity by 10%, or even 15%, meant a return to 2007 standard of living for much of the country, still a great improvement over the turn of the decade.

Keeping people busy was important for reinforcing perceptions a slowdown was not having a severe impact on their lives.  Domestic policies of building hundreds of miles of bridges, motorways, millions of square feet of empty factory may have been good policies in the 1990s and earlier 2000s when infrastructure was less well developed.  They may be less beneficial now, but in a period of perhaps two years when the opportunity cost of such projects was low they would not necessarily be bad policies.  Here he echoed his earlier point:  the mis-match of required skills at the village level vs. returning workers' skill sets, a large policy dilemma.

While public spending could work out as inflationary, decreased expectations of wage earners could have a deflationary impact.  Withdrawal of funds from the banking sector could have a further deflationary impact if it were accompanied by a decrease in the velocity of money.  Fiscal policies could have definite monetary impact:  monetary policy could be erratic.

At this point a non-banker left the table complaining farting would lead to a more conclusive discussion.  Heeding this point we all ended in agreement - there is a lot of domestic and international discussion of, and pre-empting of, unfolding policies - it's unclear to many what will happen, but will become a lot clearer post further policy announcements mid-February.  For now many are waiting in expectation.

What to Expect in the Year of the Ox

Two thousand and nine will mark the Year of the Ox in the Chinese lunar calendar.  Here's what Paranormality.com has to say about it:

[The Ox year] is one in which success will escape without a sustained, mindful effort.  The sort of problems that are encountered in the year of the Ox tend to be home front problems that seem to be never ending.  The Ox year needs discipline and it is not the time for unruly behaviour or taking short cuts.  In this year success is achieved solely through hard work.

In addition, 2009 will be a Wood Ox year:

The Earth Ox - resolute, enduring, motivated by patience, is focused and genuine.

This would indeed make a change from volatile stock markets, real estate bubbles, dodgy banks, natural disasters, political bickering and protectionist gesturing.  Will 2009 be any better?  Perhaps only if we are resolute, enduring, motivated by patience, focused and genuine, but how likely is that?

Real Indicators: How is the Financial Crisis Affecting Workers?

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Psychology affects economies.  If the public expect inflation there's a good chance inflation will happen.  If the public feel a need to tighten the purse strings they will buy less - less products and services are transacted - people earn less.  For the Great Chinese Consumer to up their consumption levels, thus maintaining levels of employment, they'd probably have to feel quite financially secure.

It doesn't look like they're feeling financially secure.  Two indicators:

1.  A Tweet* by an executive in a large China-based Internet gaming site mentioned a fall in traffic in the daytimes, which he attributed to office workers cutting-back their time spent online between 11:30am and 4pm:  Office workers are worried about their jobs.

2.  A conversation with a director of a Dalian HR firm, mainly working with white-collared and skilled industrial workers.  While some companies are continuing to hire (and some have even stepped-up hiring to get talent they wouldn't usually have access to) he has seen a marked contraction of workers in already in employment seeking to move company:  loyalty has increased (and ambition squashed) as a result of the turmoil.
 
There are a host of other indicators, from the price of a massage to the amount of socks my local sock seller is going through (not many, down a lot on last year) to electricity consumption.  The above two are rather direct and stark suggestions that employees are keeping their head down and are more worried than several months ago about losing their job.

The issue of household consumption, a high savings rate, I feel, is more structural than cyclical. Government spending needs to go into policies that structurally reduce the aggregate savings rate: increased acceptability/accessibility of insurance (health and social), or increased socialism of the health and education systems - the public currently hoard money - such hoarding would be unnecessary if greater diversification of risk and expenses were possible.  If they're worried about their jobs they're just going to hoard more.  And then there's the falling share of wages as a proportion of GDP in general.

*Since he later deleted the Tweet I'll not name him.

Factories and Jobs: How Much Intervention?

With unemployment threatening to rise, and GDP growth softening, will the government intervene to protect employment as they have done in the past?  Two months ago Black and White Cat wrote about an assignment in Liaoning at the beginning of the decade.  One passage stood out:

"One conference room after another. In one of them, in another city, the factory boss told us he would have loved to show us round the workshops, but unfortunately he couldn’t because it was too hot. The law required that if the temperature rose above a certain level, the workers had to be given the day off. It had passed that level, so the factory was temporarily closed. Very enlightened. Perhaps.

"He said the Southeast Asian economic crisis had definitely affected the factory in terms of exports, but business was still good and this was certainly not the reason for the temporary closure. Since we didn’t meet any of the workers and we would soon be driven off to somewhere else, there was no way we could find out if this was true."

The same was true not just of Liaoning, though heavy industry SOEs are in higher concentration there.  While headline statistics suggested China was affected less than much of Southeast Asia, it was affected, and lots of rules and law that were previously unenforced became enforced, new laws were enacted, with the effect dampening the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis and cushioning local economies from vacuums left by the break-up of loss-generating state industry.

All Roads linked to Shanghai Daily articles: Chinese SOEs see double-digit decline in profits in 1st 11 months and More than 200 enterprises promise no job or salary cuts in Shanghai.

When sales fall, and don't look to rise for a while, required input in a business or manufacturing process usually falls too - but not jobs or salaries?  SOEs may remain under official policy direction, but this time it's a little different.  The state is less of an employer than it once was.  Yet the desire to maintain jobs and social stability remains the same.  How much intervention, and in what manner?  Unemployed garment manufacturers are unlikely to make good bridge builders.  It will certainly be tempting for local governments to ensure the new employment law will be upheld, and perhaps throw in a few by-laws.

 

China 30 Years On: The Hairdresser and the Mobile Telephone

China has just celebrated 30 years since Economic Reform and Opening were first carried out.  There's still a lot to do, but sometimes it's nice to reflect on just what has changed, and how far things really have come.

The Hairdresser.

Liaoning provincial TV network just aired a show on how the little things in life have changed over the past 30 years.  It was quite the summary of just how things have moved on from true, proper, Stalin-Maoist communist times.  Anaecdotes to bear in mind when beaucracy of developing countries seems unbearable: it used to be a lot more unbearable.

林理發 was a hairdresser with a hairdressing Danwei (work unit) since the 1970s.  In 1978 he earned 26 Yuan per month.

It cost 6.5 Yuan to get your haircut.  But you needed a certificate stamped and signed by your own Danwei stating you must have a haircut.

Now anyone can open a hairdressing salon, with any city street almost certainly lined with the rotating lollipop poles, it often seems everyone has.

The Mobile Phone.

Inequality isn't anything new.  On the same program a man showed off his mobile telephone.  He bought it in 1990 for 38,000 Yuan.  The price was around 20,000 Yuan, but being in short supply an extra fee (bribe) was necessary to actually buy it - the same money would have bought a couple of apartments.  Ten years prior all telephone calls were routed through operators.  Mobile telephones are affordable; China now has the most mobile telephone subscribers in the world.

Such observations are nothing new nor original.  But that doesn't make them the transition any less amazing.

Not An Unprecedented Investment Opportunity

Motley Fool recently ran a story: 'An Unprecedented Investment Opportunity'.

Alex was forwarded the story by a friend.  He rarely reads Motley Fool, but when he does he's invariably overpowered by the noise to signal ratio, either feeling sad that people actually waste their time reading it, or consoling himself that it usually better reading than a lot of 'propriety' broker research.

This article contained the phrase "If you're an American investor, you're lucky to have even 2% exposure to China -- and that makes you dangerously underexposed."  This is not an especially original or insightful thing to say.  More direct variants of the phrase have echoed around the financial world since the mid 90s, vaguer ones long before.

Why would an average North American, or European, investor, want or need exposure to China?

Investors and Investment Advisors, typically flit around the following strategies, depending on the state of the market or what everyone else is saying:
1. Preserve wealth.
2. Makes lots of money.
3. Match wealth against liabilities.

Investors also seek to invest money over the following time periods:
A. The space of a day.
B. A couple of decades.
C. Some space in-between.

3B/3C:  Matching assets against liabilities became fashionable speak when Alex was in Pension World in the middle of the noughties:

1.  Does China's rise mean it will impact your future liabilities?  Will China's rise affect your future spending commitments, and if how so?

It does and it will, likely through a variety of channels, these channels should determine your investment in 'China'.  An increase in global energy consumption, food consumption, possibly higher education fees, or even real estate prices in your home country could be affected by an increase in Chinese incomes, and therefore purchasing power.  None of these necessarily mean investing in China will offset that effectively, while investing in commodities, education, ways in which China will affect you more directly, may help.

2.  Even if you thought of investing in China, would it be a good idea, and how would it be done?

Anglo Saxon countries posses financial markets that are not representative of financial markets in other countries, let alone China.  The US, UK, Australia, etc tend to have have high stock market capitalisation:GDP ratios.  This means that over time (long term) the stock market will track the economy, as the stock market is representative of the economy, when it goes down, when it goes up*. [OK, plus Entrepreneurship not capitalised, which IIRC Schiller calculated as around half of real GDP growth for the US in the last century, hardly insignificant.]

Choosing a good time to buy is hard in foresight and rather or simple in hindsight (if you're case 3B/3C in the example above, try to use statistics that are 3 decades+ in length, this tends to add retrospective hindsight should one imagine previous 'unprecedented opportunities'**).

But to buy what in China?  The stock market does not represent the economy, or even come close to representing it.  Government owned companies which lose money/soak up subsidies like a US Auto-maker, are over represented.  Smaller, more innovative companies, especially in the case of China, make up a large amount of economic growth but are under-represented in Stock Markets, especially China's.  Companies in China rarely have access to Commercial Paper/Bond Markets, Private Equity effectively does not exist; a lot of China's innovators depend on funding from family, friends and illegal banks - it is simply hard to access 'growth' in China, especially small and medium sized firms.

3.  Active Management and 'Adding Alpha'.

Adding alpha (the proportion of growth attributable to a Fund Manager's skill, opposed to Beta, their exposure to their benchmark) is hard in any market.  Yet many active investors are good at it, especially in Emerging Markets.  This is because they choose a benchmark completely inappropriate for measuring their actual performance.  There's nothing like investing in companies with market caps of $30mn USD and comparing your performance against rust-bucket state monopolies slowly getting dismantled and shut down... over an inappropriate time period (i.e. whatever looks best).

And no, you're not going to invest independently and perform sufficient due diligence when annual reports are in Chinese, potentially cooked, and with a large invisible hand of government preferring some old school friends over others.  And the exchange data-rates are slow for stat traders.  You're not going to be 2A with any degree of ability or success.

1A?  Avoid China.  Buy Gold or something equally archaic.

3B again.  Move to China?   Your assets might not change much but watch those liabilities disappear.  Party like it's 1999.

A 2B or a 2C might be able to have a degree of success, but avoid threatening noises to invest in markets that are not driven by fundamentals, where even blatant government intervention fails to lift the market, where markets are unlikely to match GDP growth over the long term, and where an 'unprecedented opportunity'** happens every couple of years.

* Key in this thinking is that employers support (keep payments going
into) pension funds when the stock market goes up, they didn't do this
in the 1990s ('payment holiday')... and we still suffering underfunded
pension funds.

** The second of the article's three points.

/rant

Private Infrastructure Investment in China

Infrastructure Opportunity in China

The size and scale of infrastructure investment in China is unparalleled in modern history. This boom has been driven by voracious economic growth and the largest urbanization shift ever recorded. This shift has created an ever-increasing appetite for everyday basic needs from water and electricity, to telecommunications and improved transportation. In order to meet this demand, China will need massive investment outlays.

Demand Drivers for Infrastructure Investment
China’s economy has been a juggernaut for nearly three decades, averaging annual double digit increases in GDP. During this time, policymakers have focused on export-driven growth. As the country has developed, a strong, growing demand for physical infrastructure and intellectual capital has emerged. Investors are able to capitalize on this opportunity by making timely and well-researched investments.
China’s leadership recognizes the need for infrastructure investment in the form of physical capital and expertise. China’s 11th Five Year Plan, spanning from 2006 to 2010, explicitly addresses these infrastructure needs by laying out clear developmental goals. These goals encompass everything from energy and water consumption per output of GDP, to solid waste recovery. The plan calls for $300 billion in both rail and road construction. In addition, China’s Ministry of Transport has stated that it will seek multiple sources of funding to develop ports.
Although the current plan may seem overly ambitious, China has already laid the foundations of their own infrastructure. Since the 10th Five Year Plan, the Chinese government has spent billions of dollars to create a system of highways and railways to alleviate poverty and income disparity. As infrastructure markets have developed past infancy stages, investor’s will bear less risk than supporting fledging developmental initiatives.
Despite the recent financial turmoil in global markets, China has maintained consistent and stable growth. This is not a fluke. The current regime has tried to stabilize its influence through economic growth, with measurable improvements in the lives of its citizens. In order to maintain this stability, the government has a stated goal of maintaining an annual GDP growth rate of at least 7.5%. In order to maintain this growth rate, new infrastructure projects will be needed to power factories, transport more goods, and house its citizens. Because of this, the government has strong reason to embrace infrastructure investments and promote economic growth in any financial climate.

Country Specific Risks
Investors should be aware of any country specific risks when evaluating any potential foreign investment. Within China, particular attention should be paid to an opaque legal system fragmented decision-making between government agencies, and a perceived lack of transparency. Each of these issues presents a significant risk, but are interrelated but can overcome.
The legal and regulatory framework for infrastructure investment in China is still underdeveloped by Western standards. Because of this potential lack of legal protection, a high degree of importance is placed on personal relationships. In lieu of legal protections, business partners must foster a deeper sense trust than might otherwise be necessary. In the context of an investment, parties should be thoroughly vetted and ample time should be spent growing the relationship.
Decision making for investments is highly fragmented. Different levels of bureaucracy, from local prefectures to national assemblies, compete for authority in all aspects of decision-making. Gaining approval for an investment can add considerable amounts of time and money to any due diligence process. However, maintaining good business relationships can ease this concern.
The perceived lack of transparency can be intimidating by the uninitiated observer. Foreign firms often voice the common complaint that processes used for competitive bidding and the awarding of contracts lacks consistent clarity. Once again, investors can improve their knowledge by placing high emphasis on business relationships.
In addition to the previous interrelated issues, there are other risks which must be taken into consideration. The bond market, which is normally a key source of funding for infrastructure investments in developed countries, is woefully under-developed by traditional financial measures. This places a greater initial burden on investors in infrastructure projects as they must provide a greater percentage of required capital outlays. This can present both a challenge and an opportunity to investors. The challenge is in arranging funding for a given investment, which are usually quite large. This often requires multiple sources of private funding. Without mature debt markets the burden of initial funding falls on a single investor or group of investors. While an investor will bear more of the risk for a large project, it is also an opportunity to demand a higher risk premium.
An additional risk is the lack of history of private infrastructure investment, a relatively new phenomenon, from which potential investors can glean knowledge. This poses a significant risk when analysts are trying to quantify and value risks in a given project as there is no established benchmark for doing so. While foreign enterprises have heavily invested for decades in other areas such as manufacturing, there is little history of foreign investment across infrastructure sectors.
Despite these challenges, the market for infrastructure investment in China is too large to be ignored. With proper risk management and careful planning, these hazards can be mitigated thus providing a unique opportunity for investors.

Appealing Sectors
Within the spectrum of infrastructure investments, there are many specific opportunities in the development of roads, railways, and energy producing resources. Each sector presents its own set of unique challenges.

Toll Roads
China has invested billions constructing a system of roads connecting the country. Of these roads, an estimated 55% are toll roads. Toll roads have become so popular because payment is easy to lay and even easier to collect. For example, driving from Beijing to the southeastern city of Fuzhou will likely require travel on two major highways and at least one provincial road. The sum total of toll expenses for this trip would be roughly 1600 RMB, greater than the price of a plane ticket.
Toll Roads provide the greatest number of possible investments for a foreign investor. There are no restrictions that prevent, theoretically, a foreign investor from being the sole owner of a toll road. Investors might also consider establishing a joint venture with local companies or government agencies. Additionally, there are many publically traded companies that own toll roads.
This ease of investing is not without specific risks though. Local government often controls the scale of tolls. Officials could limit or decrease the permissible toll in inflationary environments, forcing investors into losses.

Railway
Considerable resources have been invested in railways construction. The development of a rail network has been christened a national priority in previous Five Year Plans. Because of its vital importance to national security the vast majority of funds used in the development of railway have come from government sources; less than 2% of the total amount of funds used for railway development has come from private sources.
While most investors will find it difficult to make direct investments in railways, many rail companies are publically traded on international exchanges, allowing for private investments. A very limited number of foreign investors may be able to make direct investments in high-tech railways. Technology for maglev technologies between Shanghai and the Pudong International Airport outside of the city has recently been deployed. Plans for additional maglev lines between Shanghai and Hangzhou have been made and construction is underway. Investors should be wary, as maglev railways are extremely expensive to construct and operate.

Ports and Waterways
In addition to railways and highways, China is also rapidly upgrading its ports and waterways. The export engine of the economy demands that a greater volume of goods bed shipped from the shores of China to importing countries. Because of this strong connection to China’s exports and economic growth, there have been many foreign investments in port infrastructure, contrary to other sectors. In comparison to other sectors, the opportunities for new port investments are limited. Investors should note some demand for port services will likely decrease if exports decline in the current global economic environment.

Power Generation
The unprecedented demographic shift over the past two decades that has seen urban populations swell has put tremendous pressure on existing power generation capacity. During the middle of the decade, prolonged brownouts were a common occurrence in many urban centers in China. In order to alleviate this, China has constructed a staggering amount of power generation capacity totaling some 300 million kilowatts. Reflecting some of the earlier stated risks in infrastructure investments, the approval for these power plants came from a wide variety of sources without the benefit of central planning. As a result, the vast majority of these plants use dated and inefficient coal-fired technologies, which create heavy pollution.
Part of the 11th Five Year Plan dictates that the energy used per unit of GDP be decreased by 20%. Additionally, the plan calls for a decrease in pollution. In order to meet these goals older, less efficient, and high-polluting power plants must be deactivated and replaced by efficient, clean plants. This creates an opportunity for private investors to enter the market. Two high-profile examples of this are General Electric and Westinghouse, which were both awarded substantial contracts for the construction of nuclear reactors.
Investors in this sector should be wary that while the government has signaled that it desires to move towards market pricing for electric power and fine excessive polluting, it has been slow to do so. In fact, as inflation has increased in the past year, the government has frozen energy prices, effectively capping returns.

Renewable Energy
Rapid economic growth in China has devastated the environment. In particular, the reliance on coal-fired power plants emits heavy pollution. Policymakers have recently embraced renewable energies as potential solutions to this problem. The government has enacted new laws and programs, promoting and mandating the use of renewable energies, with the goal of doubling the current usage of renewable energies by 2010.
Currently, there is a deficit of renewable energy projects. The most visible plans call for wind farms along the Mongolian border, and solar farms throughout the country. Investors with a demonstrated track record in developing alternative energy sources might consider these possibilities.
For any given sector, the Chinese government has vast reserves of dollars, dwarfing any private source of funding, which can be tapped for funding infrastructure projects. Successful private investors should be mindful of this at all times. In addition to private capital, it is essential that private investors bring sector-specific technical knowledge and skill.
Opportunities for infrastructure investment in China are not without their risks. Despite the risks, the staggering demand for infrastructure services provides more than ample opportunity for rewards for the intrepid investor.

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